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ABSTRACT
Foodborne illness outbreaks linked to the consumption of fresh produce expose fruit and
vegetable growers to uncertain legal and compensatory costs associated with product liability
actions. Product liability insurance protects farmers against the risk of financial loss from
product liability actions and may create opportunities for market expansion, but insights from
recent focus groups suggest that Tennessee farmers may perceive this insurance coverage as cost
prohibitive. This study evaluates the factors influencing adoption of product liability insurance
among Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers. Using data from a 2013 survey of Tennessee
fruit and vegetable farmers, factors influencing the adoption decision are first evaluated using a
single-equation probit regression. Results from the first regression approach suggest that
perceptions of product liability risk and acres in fruit and vegetable production are positive
determinants of adoption. The model was then expanded to a two-stage probit regression
approach to account for simultaneity between adoption of product liability insurance and product
liability risk perceptions. Findings from the two-stage regression approach suggest that
perception of product liability risk is not a significant determinant of the insurance adoption
decision.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Demand for fresh produce has recently increased in the US. In addition to improved yearround availability associated with rising imports, widespread governmental efforts to synthesize
an evolving body of knowledge about the health benefits associated with consuming fresh
produce is among the key drivers of change (Cook, 2011). Numerous federal programs aim to
increase US consumption of fresh produce as a means to combat obesity, which is largely
concentrated in the Southeastern states (CDC, 2015). However, concerns over the prevalence of
foodborne illness outbreaks related to fresh produce have the potential to deter market growth for
fresh fruits and vegetables (Boys, 2013).
Foodborne illnesses affect nearly 48 million people each year in the US (CDC, 2013).
Hoffmann, Maculloch, and Batz (2015) estimated that, on average, the annual economic burden
imposed by fifteen major foodborne pathogens is $15.5 billion. On the other hand, Scharff
(2015) suggested that foodborne illnesses generated an estimated $54.9 billion in health-related
costs annually in the US. Between 1998 and 2008, produce accounted for 46 percent of
foodborne illnesses and 23 percent of deaths reported to the CDC’s Foodborne Disease Outbreak
Surveillance System (Painter et al., 2013). DeWaal et al. (2015) linked produce to more
foodborne illnesses than any other food group using a compilation of foodborne illness outbreaks
reported to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention between 2003 and 2012.
Due to growing concern about food safety issues associated with fresh produce,
improving safety throughout the food supply chain has become a national health objective. As a
result, food safety regulation in the US has transformed dramatically in recent years. Food safety
issues related to fresh produce have also spurred interest in improved traceability, or the ability
to track food products “from the grower to the consumer’s plate” (Wilson and Clarke, 1998). For
1

example, following the 2006 E. coli outbreak linked to spinach, the farm that produced the
contaminated spinach could only be identified after an extensive investigation had taken place,
exposing the need for improved traceability in the produce industry (Pouliot and Sumner, 2008).
Innovations in traceability systems improve the likelihood of identifying responsible parties in
the case of a foodborne illness outbreak, ultimately increasing grower accountability for potential
foodborne illness outbreaks (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001). In turn, producers are
increasingly susceptible to legal action by consumers claiming monetary damages for illnesses
caused by contaminated food products, also called product liability (PL) risk (Rejesus and
Dunlap, 2009).
Public and private regulation, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms designed to
reduce the incidence of foodborne illness outbreaks have primarily focused on improving food
safety standards (Havinga, 2012). For example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food
Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), which was finalized in November 2015, established the first
science-based minimum safety standards for growing, harvesting, packing, and handling fruits
and vegetables for human consumption (USFDA, 2016). Unaddressed by new regulations is the
extent to which firms are liable for foodborne illness (Boys et al. 2015).
Monetary losses associated with litigation can be sizable. These include costs associated
with jury verdicts (i.e., financial compensation to a plaintiff), court costs, and legal fees, the
latter of which may be incurred regardless of legal conclusions (Henson and Hooker, 2001).
Mahdu (2015) reviewed the outcomes of 511 foodborne illness lawsuits between 1979 and 2014,
finding that compensation to successful plaintiffs ranged from $151 to $6.2 million.
Whereas intermediate and retail outlets often place specific PL insurance requirements on
their suppliers, direct-to-consumer market outlets generally have less explicit requirements of
2

this type (Holcomb, Palma, and Velandia, 2013; Velandia et al., 2014). Generally, direct-toconsumer outlets such as farmers markets and Community Supported Agriculture have limited or
no requirements specifically associated with PL insurance (Boys, 2013). Findings from a 2011
survey of Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers found that fresh produce growers in
Tennessee made nearly 75% of their sales through direct-to-consumer outlets (Wolanin, 2013).
Therefore, Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers may be less likely to carry PL insurance than
farmers who sell more of their produce through intermediate or retail outlets.
Producers can mitigate their exposure to PL risk through precautionary measures such as
third-party audits and/or certifications. Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) certification1, for
example, involves an on-farm audit by a third-party to verify adherence to guidelines or industryspecific protocols upheld by the auditing organization (Rejesus, 2009; Critzer and Wzselaki,
2012). Additionally, compliance with quality assurance standards may serve as a legal defense
against claims of negligence (Connally, 2009). While precautionary measures such as GAP
compliance reduce the risk of microbial contamination, the economic benefit of reducing
microbial risk only accrue to the producer in a fooborne illness outbreak (Rejesus, 2009).
Nonetheless, there may be indirect benefits such as access to market outlets requiring this type of
certification.
Previous studies have generally evaluated produce farmer perceptions of risk (e.g.
Hanson et al., 2004; Ali and Kapoor, 2008; Velandia et al., 2014), and the use of GAP as a risk
management strategy among them (Sriwichailamphan et al., 2008; Kersting and Wollni, 2012;
Marine et al., 2016). However, less understood are the factors influencing the adoption of PL risk

1

GAP audits for fresh produce are offered by numerous organizations and vary in scope (Critzer and Wszelaki,
2012), but many organizations, including the USDA Produce GAP audit program, use harmonized standards
promoted by United Fresh Produce Association (USDA-AMS, 2015; UFPA, 2016).
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management strategies, such as PL insurance (Ivey, LeJeune, and Miller, 2012; Boys, 2013). The
objective of this research is to determine the factors influencing the adoption of PL insurance
among Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers.
In addition to providing protection against PL risk, PL insurance may be used as a
marketing or differentiation strategy (Boys, 2013). Thus, adopting PL insurance may help
producers access new market opportunities. Farmer inability to adopt PL insurance may also
imply market exclusion and marginalization (Handschuch, Wollni, and Villalobos, 2013).
Therefore, understanding the factors influencing the adoption of PL insurance by fruit and
vegetable producers is an important step in determining measures that policy makers can
implement to equip Tennessee producers with tools necessary to maintain their competitiveness
under a new regulatory environment while providing safe products to consumers. This
information may also help insurance companies better target producers more likely to adopt PL
insurance.

4

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Hardaker et al. (2015) refers to ‘risk’ as exposure to uncertain outcomes. Therefore, by
engaging in the production and sale of food products, which are affected by many factors both
within and beyond the farmer’s control, farmers are exposed to the risk of loss or harm to others.
Previous literature provides numerous classifications for the types of risks faced by farmers.
Generally, these include production, market, financial, legal, environmental, and human risk
(Harwood et al., 1999; Hardaker et al., 2015).
In addition to facing price and production risk, fresh produce growers are exposed to risk
related to the perishable nature of fruits and vegetables in addition to PL risk (Ligon, 2001;
Martinez et al., 2010). For example, due to the highly perishable nature of fresh produce, fruit
and vegetable growers generally have less time to pursue alternate buyers and/or more favorable
prices after harvesting their produce (Schieffer and Vassalos, 2015). Many fresh produce
growers rely on local direct-to-consumer marketing channels, intermediated channels, or a
combination of the two (Low et al., 2015). Direct-to-consumer marketing channels, in particular,
may increase producer exposure to PL risk (Dunn, Harper, and Greaser, 2000).
Microbial contamination of fresh produce can occur at any point during production,
processing, distribution, or preparation (CDC, 2016). Since fresh fruits and vegetables are often
consumed raw with minimal processing, pathogen contamination is an inherent risk faced by
produce farmers (Tauxe et al., 1997). Further, producers selling directly to consumers could
easily be linked to a contaminated product, decreasing the chances of a legal outcome favoring
farmers in the case of PL litigation (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001).
The adoption of risk management tools among US row crop farmers has been intensively
studied by agricultural economists, specifically the utilization of risk management tools such as
5

crop insurance, forward contracting, and spreading sales (Knight et al., 1989; Goodwin and
Schroeder, 1994; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Sherrick et al., 2004; Velandia et al., 2009). In
contrast, research regarding the adoption of risk management tools by fruit and vegetable
producers is limited (Hanson et al., 2004; Uematsu and Mishra, 2011; Vassalos and Li, 2016).
Several studies have evaluated the factors influencing the adoption of GlobalGAP and
GAP certification2, while others have focused on the adoption of food safety and quality
standards among fruit and vegetable producers (e.g., Sriwichailamphan et al., 2008; Kersting
and Wollni, 2012; Handschuch, Wollni, and Villalobos, 2013; Adalja and Lichtenberg, 2015;
Marine et al., 2016). In the area of PL risk, there are a few studies that have examined attributes
influencing jury verdicts in food product liability lawsuits (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001;
Mahdu, 2015). Only one study analyzed the adoption of PL insurance among specialty crop
producers (Boys, 2013).
Sriwichailamphan et al. (2008) evaluated the factors influencing GAP adoption among
pineapple farmers in Thailand. Their analysis found that adoption of GAP was significantly
influenced by age, average price received by farmers, average yield, use of marketing contracts,
environmental concerns, buyer requirements, and farmer progressiveness.
Handschuch, Wollni, and Villalobos (2013) examined the adoption of voluntary food
safety and quality standards among Chilean raspberry producers. They also evaluated the impact
of adoption on farm performance. Their findings suggest that gender, education, farm size, and
membership in a farming association affected adoption of voluntary food safety and quality
standards. Implementation of these standards was found to positively affect farmer income.

2

GAP and GlobalGAP certifications are risk management tools that farmers can use to protect their businesses
against PL risk.
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Marine et al. (2016) used survey data from Maryland and Delaware vegetable growers to
evaluate the influence of vegetable acres farmed, farming experience, and market channels used
to sell products on the likelihood of adopting various on-farm food safety practices including
GAP certification. The authors found that farm size and market channels used to sell produce
influenced GAP adoption.
Adalja and Lichtenberg (2015) used data from a national survey of US fruit and vegetable
growers to evaluate the influence of farm size and farming practices use on the adoption of food
safety measures required by the Food Safety Modernization Act’s Standards for the growing,
harvesting, packing, and holding of produce for human consumption (i.e., Produce Rule). The
study also evaluated differences in costs associated with implementing these food safety
measures. After controlling for differences in crop type, marketing channels, and farming
practices, they found no significant impact of farm size on the use of the various food safety
measures evaluated. In contrast, farm size influenced the cost of complying with food safety
measures. Their results suggest that the cost of food safety measures regulated by the FSMA’s
Produce Rule exhibit economies of scale and support the notion that compliance by smaller firms
is more burdensome.
Boys (2013) summarized data from a survey of small- and medium-scale producers
located in the southeastern US that evaluated producer motivations and barriers to adopt an
insurance providing PL coverage. Buyer requirements, liability concerns, and interest in
improving marketing strategies were found to be the main motivations for the adoption of an
insurance policy providing PL coverage. Respondents indicated that the benefits of having this
type of insurance policy included improved market access, mitigated risk of litigation, and
improvements in farm reputation.
7

The Role of Perceptions of Risk on the Adoption of Risk Management Tools
Several studies have investigated the role of producer perceptions and producer
understanding of risk on the adoption of risk management tools (e.g., Boggess, Anaman, and
Hanson, 1985; Harwood et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2003; Velandia et al., 2009; Le and Cheong,
2010). In the context of PL risk, Ivey, LeJeune, and Miller (2012) examined vegetable producer
perceptions and knowledge about food safety, food contamination, and GAP using data from a
survey of vegetable producers located in Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Kentucky. Their analysis
found that most vegetable producers do not believe contamination is most likely to occur on the
farm. However, these producers indicated interest in obtaining information about sources of
product contamination and GAP guidelines.
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CHAPTER III: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Foodborne illnesses linked to the consumption of fruits and vegetables expose producers
to the risk of financial loss associated with product liability actions. Producer 𝑖 has initial wealth
of 𝑤, but runs the risk of losing 𝐿 dollars when facing a lawsuit for illness or death associated with
the production and sale of contaminated products (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995). The
probability of producer 𝑖 incurring loss 𝐿, which encompasses compensatory costs to victims, court
costs, and legal fees, is denoted by 𝑝. The probability of loss is assumed to be a function of farmspecific factors including, but not limited to, sales volume, type of produce farmed and sold, and
management practices (e.g., GAP certification). If no contamination occurs, the producer’s wealth
is unaffected. If contamination resulting in foodborne illness and/or death occurs, but a consumer
of the contaminated product does not seek compensation from the court system, producer 𝑖’s
wealth also remains unchanged. Using a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995) producer 𝑖’s expected utility function is
𝑈(𝑤) = 1 − 𝑝 𝑢 𝑤 + 𝑝𝑢 𝑤 − 𝐿 .

(1)

Consider the availability of insurance with premium 𝜋, which is assumed to be a function
of producer i's gross annual sales (Spilker, 2015). The indemnity amount 𝐼 is paid by the insurance
provider for actual economic losses incurred by producer 𝑖. Pursuant to the insurance contract, the
insurance provider agrees to indemnify losses incurred by the producer up to a specified level of
coverage, 𝑞, such that 𝐼 ≤ 𝑞. Producer’s 𝑖 expected wealth when PL insurance is purchased is 𝑤 −
𝜋. In contrast, producer 𝑖’s wealth when loss 𝐿 occurs is 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝐿 + 𝐼. Producer 𝑖’s expected
utility of being insured is
(2)

𝑈1 𝑤 = 1 − 𝑝 𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 + 𝑝𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝐿 + 𝐼 ;
s.t. 𝐼 < 𝐿.
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Subtracting equation (1) from (2) results in
∆𝑈 = 𝑈1 . − 𝑈 . .

(3)

Assuming producer 𝑖 makes decisions consistent with maximizing his or her expected utility over
wealth, the producer will adopt PL insurance if ∆𝑈 > 0, or where the expected utility of adopting
insurance exceeds the expected utility of not adopting insurance such that 𝑈1 . > 𝑈 . . Since ∆𝑈
is unobservable, producer 𝑖’s decision to purchase PL insurance, 𝑦, is modeled as a dichotomous
variable, such that
𝑦=

(4)

1 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑈 > 0
.
0 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑈 ≤ 0

Product Liability Insurance and State Contingent Benefits
It can be shown that producer 𝑖’s expected utility of adopting insurance depends on the
realization of loss. First, consider the case where loss 𝐿 is realized. Factoring out the probability
of loss, 𝑝, from equation (3) leads to
(5)

𝑝[𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝐿 + 𝐼 − 𝑢 𝑤 − 𝐿 ].

Hence, if 𝐿 is realized, the producer benefits from purchasing PL insurance only if 𝐼 > 𝜋 + 𝐿. If
no loss occurs, 1 − 𝑝 can be factored out of equation (3):
(6)

(1 − 𝑝)[𝑢 𝑤 − 𝜋 − 𝑢 𝑤 ].

Therefore, if insurance is purchased and no loss occurs, the insurance premium, 𝜋, accrues to the
producer as a negative benefit and, thus, PL insurance would not be preferred.

10

CHAPTER IV: DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
Data
Data for this study was obtained from a mail survey of Tennessee fruit and vegetable
producers conducted in 2013. The sample consisted of 495 fruit and vegetable producers listed in
the Tennessee Department of Agriculture’s Pick Tennessee Products program website (TDA,
2015). On April 1, 2013, the first survey mailing was distributed along with a cover letter
explaining the purpose of the study and a prepaid return envelope. Postcard reminders were sent
out on April 19, 2013, followed by a final wave of mailings to producers who had not yet
completed the survey on April 29, 2013. Of the 495 surveys mailed, 163 were completed and
returned. Out of 163 returned surveys, 18 responses were from producers who either no longer
produce and/or sell fruits and/or vegetables, or farmers who produce fruits and vegetables solely
for personal consumption. These observations were eliminated, resulting in a usable response
rate of 29.3% (145).
Survey respondents were introduced to the concept of PL insurance as an instrument that
could help protect producers by limiting the extent of their exposure to risk associated with
consumer claims of injury caused by harmful or contaminated products. The survey included
questions about producer risk perceptions, familiarity with and use of risk management tools
including PL insurance, cost and level of coverage associated with PL insurance, reason for not
using PL insurance, sources of information about PL insurance, and general farm operator and
farm business characteristics (see survey instrument in Appendix B).
Secondary data on county-level characteristics was obtained from the 2012 Census of
Agriculture (USDA-NASS, 2012). Age distributions of fruit and vegetable growers were used to
determine the extent to which the sample was representative of the population under
11

consideration. The number of farms with vegetables, potatoes, and melons harvested for fresh
market was also obtained for use in the regression models.
Empirical Model
Socioeconomic and demographic factors that influence risk attitudes may also affect risk
management decisions, such as the choice to purchase crop insurance (Smith and Baquet, 1996).
Hence, previous literature evaluating the factors influencing risk attitudes and risk management
adoption decisions served as natural starting points to identify which variables to include in the
adoption equations.
Age, experience, and educational attainment have been considered by several studies as
potential determinants of risk management decisions (e.g., Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988; Smith and
Baquet, 1996; Mishra and El-Osta, 2002; Sherrick et al., 2004; Mohammed and Ortmann, 2005;
Bukenya and Nettles, 2007; Sriwichailamphan et al., 2008; Velandia et al., 2009; Uematsu and
Mishra, 2011).
More experienced farmers may be more likely to anticipate risks associated with
producing and marketing agricultural products and, thus, more likely to use strategies such as
insurance to manage risk (Sherrick et al., 2004; Velandia et al. 2009). However, experienced
farmers may be more diversified in their portfolios, better able to self-insure against losses, and
wealthier (Smith and Baquet, 1996). If so, more experienced farmers may be less likely to adopt
insurance to manage risk, particularly if they have taken alternative measures to manage risk. For
example, Mohammed and Ortmann (2005) found that older, more experienced farmers were less
likely to purchase livestock insurance. The authors suggested that more experienced farmers may
have accumulated enough knowledge over time to cope with income variability without
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insurance (Mohammed and Ortmann, 2005). Experience (EXP) is hypothesized to be negatively
correlated with PL insurance adoption.
Smith and Baquet (1996) and Mishra and El-Osta (2002) found that education is
positively correlated with the adoption of crop insurance. Educational attainment may augment a
farmer’s ability to gather information about his or her risk exposure, including the potential
consequences of adverse outcomes (Mishra and El-Osta, 2002). Thus, education (COLLEGE) is
expected to positively influence the adoption of PL insurance. Further, education may be
correlated with wealth through its effect on off-farm wages (Mishra and El-Osta, 2002). Without
an alternative measure of financial leverage, such as the debt-to-asset ratio (e.g., Velandia et al.
2009), wealth may otherwise be difficult to adequately control for.
The extent to which producers are liable for damages caused by defective products varies
from state to state (Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco, 2001). In Tennessee, a producer who abides by
federal or state statutes or administrative regulations “prescribing standards for design,
inspection, testing, manufacture, labeling, warning, or instructions for use of a product” is able to
raise a rebuttable presumption that the product was not in an unreasonably dangerous condition
at the time of production3. Thus, a producer who demonstrates compliance with GAP standards,
which are based on federal guidelines designed to prevent foodborne illness outbreaks, not only
mitigates the risk of such an event occurring, but also reduces the likelihood of being found
guilty if a foodborne illness outbreak is linked to any product from his/her farm (Connally,
2009). Thus, it is hypothesized that GAP certified and/or trained producers (GAP) are less likely
to adopt an insurance product providing PL coverage.

3

Tennessee Code, Product Liability Actions - Tennessee Code Annotated (TCA) § 29-28-104.
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Several studies have examined the influence of farm size and gross farm sales on the
adoption of agricultural risk management strategies (e.g., Knight et al., 1989; Mishra and ElOsta, 2002; Velandia et al., 2009; Uematsu and Mishra, 2011). Larger firms have a greater
capacity to absorb costs associated with a risk management strategy, particularly if these costs
have a relatively large fixed cost component. For example, Marine et al. (2016) found that larger
vegetable farms are more likely to implement GAP than smaller farms. Farm size and farm sales
may also reflect levels of risk exposure both in terms of the likelihood of occurrence and the
amount of assets at risk. Thus, an increase in acres in fruit and vegetable production (ACRE) is
hypothesized to have a positive effect on the probability of adopting PL insurance.
Demand for insurance is expected to be greater for producers who face a higher
likelihood of exposure to insurable risk (Sherrick et al., 2004). Risk exposure has been measured
by variables indicating whether a farm produces fruits and vegetables that are considered “high
risk” (i.e., fresh produce that is highly susceptible to contamination). It is hypothesized that
producers growing high-risk products (CANTALOUPE, LETTUCE) are more likely to adopt PL
insurance (Redman, 2007). Growers of “high-risk” products may be more likely to take actions
to protect themselves from potential adverse outcomes associated with selling contaminated
products. For example, Velandia et al. (2014) found that farmers who produce high-risk fruits
and vegetables, such as lettuce and cantaloupes, are less likely to overlook PL risk.
Risk preferences are also important factors to consider when evaluating the decision to
adopt insurance products (Petrolia, Landry, and Coble, 2013; Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012).
Previous studies have employed several methods measure individual risk attitudes. For example,
Petrolia, Landry and Coble (2013) incorporated experiment-based measures of risk aversion into
their model of flood insurance adoption via a real-money experiment, whereby survey
14

respondents make pairwise choices between possible risks of loss and chances of gains. The
authors found that their measure of risk aversion to loss was positively correlated with the
decision to adopt flood insurance (Petrolia, Landry, and Coble, 2013). Botzen and van den Bergh
(2012), who also focused on flood insurance adoption decisions, included an explanatory
variable representing the use of alternative insurance policies by an individual as an indicator of
revealed risk attitudes. Their findings suggested that the indicator of revealed risk preferences
was significant and positively correlated with the decision to adopt flood insurance (Botzen and
van den Bergh, 2012). In this analysis, variables indicating producer use of strategies other than
PL insurance were incorporated as proxies of risk preference. The alternative strategies
considered relate to personal and business risks faced by farmers. It is hypothesized that the
extracted factors (FACTOR1, FACTOR2) will be positively correlated with the probability of
adopting PL insurance.
Overstreet, Cegielski, and Hall (2013) suggest that attitude and social pressure (e.g.,
interaction-driven norms) are strongly correlated with the adoption of preventative innovations
that do not provide immediate benefit. However, as noted by Marra, Pannell, and Ghadim
(2003), theoretical and empirical literature often fails to adequately consider the influence of
risk, uncertainty, and learning as attitudes that may be the result of an individual mindset or
social pressure on adoption decisions. An example of individual mindset or social pressure
characteristics that could influence adoption decisions is perceptions of risk, defined as the
awareness of PL risk as a risk faced when selling produce for human consumption. It is
hypothesized that a producer who is aware of PL risk associated with selling fruits and
vegetables (RISKP) may be more likely to adopt PL insurance.

15

Finally, using results from a study evaluating small and medium scale (SMS) producer
motivations and barriers to purchase food PL insurance, Boys (2013) note that buyer
requirements and interest in improving marketing strategies influence producer decisions to
purchase PL insurance. Producers making a greater percentage of their sales through direct-toconsumer outlets generally face less stringent requirements related to PL insurance. Thus, it is
hypothesized that an increase in the percentage of sales made through direct-to-consumer outlets
(DIRECT) will negatively correlate with the probability adopting PL insurance.

16

CHAPTER V: ESTIMATION METHODS
Probit Regression
The insurance adoption decision is modeled as a random utility function (Greene, 2003).
Underlying the observed adoption decision, 𝑦, in equation (4) is the unobservable latent variable
∆𝑈, which represents the propensity to adopt PL insurance. Stated differently, ∆𝑈 is the excess
utility of adopting this risk management tool (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2012). The latent
variable ∆𝑈 in equation (3) is hypothesized to be a function of exogenous covariates, 𝑥, such that
∆𝑈 = 𝑥 = 𝛽 + 𝜀,

(7)

where 𝛽 is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and 𝜀 is a random disturbance term.
Combining the relationship between the observed choice, 𝑦, in equation (4) and the latent
variable, ∆𝑈, in equation (3), the probability of adopting PL insurance is defined as
Pr 𝑦 = 1 𝑥 = Pr ∆𝑈 > 0 𝑥);
= Pr 𝑥 = 𝛽 + 𝜀 > 0 𝑥 ;
= Pr 𝜀 > −𝑥 = 𝛽 𝑥);

(8)

= 𝐹 𝑥=𝛽 ,
where 𝐹 (∙) is the cumulative distribution function of 𝜀 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). A standard
normal distribution (i.e. 𝜇 = 0 and 𝜎 F = 1) is assumed, thus a probit regression is used in the
analysis:
(9)

Pr ∆𝑈 > 0 𝑥) = Pr 𝑦 = 1 𝑥) = 𝐹 𝑥 = 𝛽 = Φ 𝑥 = 𝛽 ,

where Φ (∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The corresponding log
likelihood function is
(10)

ln 𝐿 =

L
MNO[𝑦𝑙𝑛 Φ

𝑥 = 𝛽 + 1 − 𝑦 ln {1 − Φ 𝑥 = 𝛽 }].
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Marginal Effects of Continuous and Discrete Explanatory Variables
The marginal effect of a continuous variable is
(11)

RS T U]
RU

=

VW(U X Y)
V(U X Y)

𝛽 = 𝜙 𝑥 = 𝛽 𝛽,

where 𝜙(∙) is the standard normal density corresponding to the cumulative distribution Φ(∙). For
the case of a dummy variable, the marginal effect is
(12)

Pr[ 𝑥(V) , 𝑑 = 1] − Pr[ 𝑥 V , 𝑑 = 0],

where 𝑥 V represents the mean values of all other covariates in the model (Greene, 2003).
Two-Stage Simultaneous Probit Regression
In the case of PL insurance adoption, there may be factors that influence the adoption
decision which are simultaneously determined with the adoption decision itself. Assuming that
perceptions of PL risk influence producer decisions to adopt PL insurance, and it may be the case
that the adoption of PL insurance influences producer perceptions of PL risk. For example, farm
and farmer characteristics have been found to influence farmer adoption of risk management
tools (Velandia et al., 2009; Akinola, 2014), and farmer risk perception (Dosman, Adamowicz,
and Hrudey, 2001); Velandia et al., 2014). Thus, if perception of PL risk is simultaneously
determined by PL insurance adoption, then the variable representing perception of risk is
generally correlated with the disturbance term, 𝜀.
The consistency of maximum likelihood (ML) estimators from the probit regression rests
on the assumption that all explanatory variables included in the model are uncorrelated with the
error term. If this assumption fails (i.e., one of the explanatory variables is correlated with 𝜀), the
ML estimator does not converge in probability to the population parameter as the sample size
grows to infinity (Wooldridge, 2003). In the case that perception of PL risk and adoption of PL
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insurance are jointly determined, one possible estimation method for addressing simultaneity
between two dichotomous variables is the two-stage simultaneous probit regression (Maddala,
1983). The two-equation model is
(13)

∆𝑈 = 𝛾O 𝑦F∗ + 𝛽O= 𝑥O + 𝜀O ,

(14)

𝑦F∗ = 𝛾F ∆𝑈 + 𝛽F= 𝑥F + 𝜀F ,

(15)

𝑦F = 1 𝑦F∗ > 0 ,

where 𝑦F∗ is the latent variable associated with the observed indicator of perception of PL risk,
𝑦F , and ∆𝑈 is the latent variable underlying the observed adoption decision, 𝑦, in equation (4).
Additionally, 𝑥O and 𝑥F are exogenous variables; 𝛽O , 𝛽F , 𝛾O and 𝛾F are vectors of parameters to
be estimated; and 𝜀O and 𝜀F are random disturbance terms. The reduced forms of (13) and (14)
are
(16)

∆𝑈 = ΠO 𝑋 + 𝑣O ,

(17)

𝑦F∗ = ΠF 𝑋 + 𝑣F ,

where 𝑋 includes all exogenous variables in 𝑥O and 𝑥F . Because 𝑦F∗ and ∆𝑈 are only observed as
dichotomous variables 𝑦F and 𝑦, respectively, and 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑣O = 𝜎OF and 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑣F = 𝜎FF , it is only
possible to estimate ΠO 𝜎O and ΠF 𝜎F . Nonetheless, given that 𝜎OF and 𝜎FF are normalized to one:
(18)

ΠO 𝜎O = ΠO ,

(19)

ΠF 𝜎F = ΠF .
A necessary and sufficient condition for the identification of equation (13) is that the

number of exogenous variables that appear in equation (14) must be at least as large as the
number of endogenous variables included in (13), also called the order condition (Mallar, 1977;
Wooldridge, 2002; Greene, 2012). Table 6 presents an overview of the model specifications and
depicts variable exclusions in each model.
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After estimating the reduced form equations by probit maximum likelihood, the predicted
values of 𝑦F∗ and ∆𝑈 are substituted in equations (13) and (14), respectively, and then the
structural equations are estimated using maximum likelihood.
In the procedure, the estimated standard errors of the structural equations are based on the
fitted values of the endogenous variables, ∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗ , whereas the true variables are ∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗ .
Therefore, adjusted asymptotic covariance should be used. The adjusted asymptotic covariance
matrices of the structural equations (13) and (14) follow
(20)

𝛼O= = 𝛾O , 𝛽O= ,

(21)

𝛼F= = 𝛾F , 𝛽F= ,

(22)
(23)

𝑎O =

fg
Wg (OhWg )

, 𝑎F =

Wi (OhWi )

𝐴O = 𝜙O 𝑎O , 𝐴F = 𝜙F 𝑎F , 𝑍 =
O

(24)

𝑊O =

L

(25)

𝑊F =

L

𝑊m =

(26)
(27)

fi

𝑊n =

O
L

L
= 𝑎O 𝑎F

O
L

O

L
O 𝐴O

𝑍𝑍 = ,

L
O 𝐴F

𝑋𝑋 = ,

L
O 𝐴O

,

ΠF∗ 𝑋
,
𝑋

𝛾O 𝑍𝑋 = ,

𝐸 (𝑦O − ΦO )(𝑦F − ΦF ) 𝑋𝑍 = ,

where 𝜙O and 𝜙F are the standard normal probability density functions associated with the
estimated latent variables ∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗ from the reduced form equations (16) and (17) ; ΦO and ΦF
are the cumulative distribution functions associated with ∆𝑈 and 𝑦F∗ ; and ΠF∗ 𝑋 is the estimated
vector for 𝑦F obtained from equation (17) (Maddala, 1983). The covariance matrix is calculated
as
(28)

𝑊OhO 𝑊O − 𝑊m 𝑊FhO 𝑊n − 𝑊n= 𝑊FhO 𝑊m= + 𝑊m 𝑊FhO 𝑊m= 𝑊OhO ,
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where αqO is the true value of αO and αO is the two-stage estimator. Similarly, the covariance
matrix of αF is computed by interchanging subscripts 1 and 2 in the definitions of 𝑍 , 𝑊O , 𝑊F ,
𝑊m , and 𝑊n .
Hausman Specification Test of Endogeneity
A Hausman specification test was performed to test the null hypothesis that perceptions
of PL risk are exogenous in PL insurance adoption decisions. Estimates from the two-stage
simultaneous probit regression can be compared to the estimates produced by the single-equation
probit regression that ignored simultaneity. The Hausman statistic is
𝐻 = 𝛽s − 𝛽S

(29)

=

𝑉s − 𝑉S

hO

𝛽s − 𝛽S ,

where 𝛽s and 𝛽S are parameter estimates from the single-equation and two-stage simultaneous
equation, respectively, and 𝑉s and 𝑉S are their respective covariance matrices of.
Under the null hypothesis, the Hausman statistic, 𝐻, is distributed 𝜒 F with 𝑘 degrees of
freedom, where 𝑘 equals the number of being evaluated (Hausman, 1978). If adoption of PL
insurance and perceptions of PL risk are simultaneously determined, the parameter estimates
from the probit regression model in equation (9) are inconsistent and the null hypothesis will be
rejected.
Instrumental Variables Probit Regression
It is also possible that endogeneity exists due to omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2002). In
this case, the structural-model approach may be used (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Under the
structural-model approach, the latent variable ∆𝑈 in equation (7) is the dependent variable, while
𝑦F denotes the endogenous regressor. The latent variable ∆𝑈 is modeled as a function of
exogenous variables, 𝑥O , and the endogenous variable, 𝑦F , such that
(30)

∆𝑈 = 𝛾F 𝑦F∗ + 𝛽O= 𝑥O + 𝜖O ,
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𝑦 = 1 ∆𝑈 > 0 ,

(31)

where 𝛾O and 𝛽O are vectors of unknown parameters associated with 𝑦F and 𝑥O , respectively, and
𝜖O is a random disturbance term. The continuous endogenous regressor 𝑦F∗ is modeled as a
function of exogenous variables, 𝑥O , and additional instrumental variables, 𝑥w , such that
𝑦F∗ = 𝜋O= 𝑥O + 𝜋F= 𝑥w + 𝜖F ,

(32)

where 𝜋O and 𝜋F are vectors of parameters to be estimated and 𝜖F is a random disturbance term.
Equation (30) is the structural equation, and (32) is the reduced form equation. The vector
of instrumental variables, 𝑥w , must include variables that are correlated with 𝑦F∗ , but not
correlated with ∆𝑈 in equation (30). Assuming that the error terms (𝜖O , 𝜖F ) are jointly normally
distributed and that 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜖O = 1,
𝜖O | 𝜖F = 𝜌𝜖F + 𝑢,

(33)

where 𝜌 represents the correlation coefficient for (𝜖O , 𝜖F ), and 𝑢 is a disturbance term
independent from 𝑥O , 𝑥w , 𝜖F , and therefore 𝑦F∗ (Wooldridge, 2002). Under the null hypothesis that
𝜌 = 0, 𝜖O and 𝜖F are independent. Rejecting the null hypothesis indicates that 𝑦F∗ is indeed
endogenous. The variable of interest is adoption of PL insurance. Predicted values of perception
of PL risk from the reduced form in equation (32) are substituted into the structural equation in
(30).
Factor Analysis of Alternative Risk Management Strategies Used by Producers
Factor analysis is commonly used to examine the underlying structure of observed (i.e.,
manifest) variables and to reduce the dimensionality of a set of manifest variables (Yong and
Pearce, 2013). Motivating the decision to conduct a factor analysis is the assumption that there
exists underlying latent constructs which explain the covariation in a set of manifest variables
(O’Rourke and Hatcher, 2013).
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In their examination of the influence of message framings and food safety-related media
information on consumer risk perceptions of E. coli infection and their attitude towards food
safety technology, Britwum and Yiannaka (2016) used factor analysis to reduce the
dimensionality of responses pertaining to consumer trustworthiness rating for information from
institutions and acceptance ratings of non-conventional food production processes. Oliver (2016)
utilized factor analysis to identify underlying latent constructs related to farmer attitudes
associated with the adoption of a hypothetical prescribed grazing program, which were captured
in ratings of importance and potential outcomes measured via a 5-point Likert scale.
In this study, factor analysis was used to examine the patterns underlying producer use of
risk management strategies other than PL insurance (Table 1), which serve as a proxy of
producer risk attitudes (Botzen and van den Bergh, 2012). If manifest variables are dichotomous
in nature, the common factor model, which assumes a linear relationship between manifest
variables and factors, can generate biased estimates (Matsunaga, 2010; Flora, LaBrish, and
Chalmers, 2012). This issue is addressed by estimating the relationship between latent constructs
underlying a set of observed dichotomous variables with a tetrachoric correlation matrix
(MacCallum et al., 2002). Proposed by Pearson (1900), the tetrachoric correlation is estimated by
assuming a latent bivariate normal distribution for a pair of dichotomous variables, then
estimating the correlation between the underlying continuous variables as if they could be
observed (Greene, 2003).
For each pair of binary survey items (𝑣O , 𝑣F ), which are assumed to have a bivariate
normal distribution associated with their latent components (𝑋O , 𝑋F ) with threshold model 𝑣M = 1
if 𝑋M > 0, the tetrachoric correlation coefficient 𝑟 is estimated from the joint distribution of 𝑣O
and 𝑣F (Tallis, 1962). Pairwise estimates of the tetrachoric correlations yield the tetrachoric
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correlation matrix for use in the factor analysis procedure. The 𝑚-factor model with 𝑛 manifest
variables is
𝑥{ = 𝜆{} 𝐹} + 𝑒{ ,

(34)

where 𝐹} is a vector of latent factors, 𝑥{ is a vector of manifest variables loading onto the 𝑚th
factor, 𝑒{ is a vector of measurement error, and 𝜆{} is a matrix containing factor loadings of the
𝑛th manifest variable on the 𝑚th factor (Yong and Pearce, 2013). Factor loadings indicate the
correlation between the common factor and the manifest variables, and, thus, reflect the amount
to which a variable contributes to the factor (Kline, 1994; Yong and Pearce, 2013).
The literature offers varying recommendations as to what constitutes an adequate sample
size for factor analysis (Williams, Onsman, and Brown, 2010). Some recommendations pertain
to the number of respondents per variable included in the factor analysis, referred to as the
subject-to-item ratio and denoted by 𝑁: 𝑝. Costello and Osborne (2005), who examined 303
research articles that utilized either principal components analysis or exploratory factor analysis,
found that over 60 percent of the sampled studies using these techniques had a subject-to-item
ratio of at least 10:1. Other recommendations are concerned with the minimum sample size
necessary to obtain stable factors, which vary from 100 to 250 observations (Hogarty et al.
2005). The 𝑁: 𝑝 ratio of the factor analysis model in this study is 17.5:1. The 105 observations
are within the minimum range suggested in the literature (Hogarty et al., 2005).
Prior to the extraction of factors, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling
Adequacy was used to determine the suitability of the data for factor analysis. The overall KMO
index compares the sum of squared correlations of all variables with the sum of squared partial
correlations between pairs of variables 𝑖, 𝑗, controlling for the effects of remaining variables. The
KMO index is
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𝐾𝑀𝑂 =

(35)

i
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ˆ

i Š… i
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†‡

,

where 𝑆 = (𝑖, 𝑗; 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗), 𝑟MŽ denotes the correlation of variables 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝑎MŽ denotes the antiimage correlation (Kaiser, 1974). Models with an overall KMO index of 0.5 or less are
considered unsuitable for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). The overall KMO index of the model in
this study is 0.62.
The variance explained by an extracted factor is referred to as the eigenvalue of that
factor. To aid in determining the appropriate number of factors to retain, a scree plot was
generated by graphing the eigenvalues associated with a factor in descending order against the
factor number (Figure 1). The scree “test” involves visually examining the scree plot to identify
the natural break point in the data (Torres-Reyna, 2012). Once a break is identified, the
researcher retains the number of factors 𝑛 that lie above the natural break point (i.e., 𝑛 − 1), such
that, if the natural break point appears at 𝑛 = 5, then 4 factors are retained (Costello and
Osborne, 2005).
The scree plot from the factor analysis procedure revealed the presence of a natural
breaking point around 𝑛 = 2, suggesting the retention of one factor. Under the Kaiser criterion,
which suggests retaining only those factors with eigenvalues greater than one, only the first
factor would be retained (Costello and Osborne, 2005). However, the criteria used to determine
the number of factors to retain are not steadfast, often requiring the researcher to use his or her
best judgement (Matsunaga, 2010).
A one-factor model was examined, yielding relatively large uniqueness values and
indicating that the variables were not well-explained by the single factor (Torres-Reyna, 2012).
Moreover, the eigenvalue of the second factor (0.85) was relatively close to the Kaiser criterion
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cutoff of one. Based on these findings, the decision was made to retain two factors, which
explained 63 percent of the total variance (Table 2).
Factor loadings were rotated simplify the factor analysis output and to facilitate
interpretation of factor loadings (Thompson, 2004). Whereas orthogonal rotation assumes that
factors are uncorrelated, oblique rotation allows correlation between factors. Because risk
management decisions are expected to be correlated across different domains (Einav et al.,
2010), oblique promax rotation was used.
The variable indicating farmer use of savings (SAV) had a uniqueness value of 0.68, thus
the variable was removed and treated as a standalone variable. The factor analysis was
performed on the remaining four variables and rotated using promax rotation. Two factors
surfaced from the final analysis (Table 3). Variables that loaded onto Factor 1 were farmer use of
a commercial business insurance policy (COMB) and farm-structure as a corporation or Limited
Liability Corporation (LLC). Factor 1 was interpreted as ‘Business-oriented Farmers’. Variables
that loaded onto Factor 2 were farmer use of a comprehensive liability insurance policy (CLIAB)
and farmer use of a homeowner’s insurance policy (HOWN). Factor 2 was interpreted as
‘Community-oriented Farmers’. Producer use of an umbrella insurance policy (UMB) loaded
onto Factors 1 and 2.
The factor score coefficients relating the indicator variables to the extracted factors are
shown in Table 3. Each factor is expressed as a linear combination of the standardized indicator
variables. Factors 1 and 2 are computed as:
(36)

𝐹O = −0.0198 ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵 + 0.5403 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵 − 0.0015 ∙ 𝐻𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 0.2088 ∙ 𝑈𝑀𝐵
+ 0.2732 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐶,

and
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(37)

𝐹F = 0.3561 ∙ 𝐶𝐿𝐼𝐴𝐵 − 0.1501 ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐵 − 0.3072 ∙ 𝐻𝑂𝑊𝑁 + 0.3860 ∙ 𝑈𝑀𝐵
+ 0.1038 ∙ 𝐿𝐿𝐶,

where CLIAB indicates farmer use of a comprehensive farm liability insurance policy; COMB
indicates farmer use of a commercial business insurance policy; HOWN indicates farmer use of a
homeowner’s insurance policy; UMB indicates farmer use of an umbrella insurance policy; and
LLC indicates a farm structured as a corporation or Limited Liability Corporation (LLC).
Comparison of Sample Means
Characteristics of adopters and non-adopters were compared to evaluate differences in
characteristics between the two population subsets and to gain insight into the factors influencing
the adoption decision. Prior to employing t tests, an F test was used to compare the variances of
variables between the two subsets (Snedecor and Cochran, 1989). Next, t tests, assuming equal
or unequal variances depending on the outcome of the F test, were used to compare variable
means for farm, farmer, and county characteristics described above between adopters and nonadopters.
Multicollinearity Tests
Condition indexes were used to detect collinear relationships between explanatory
variables used in the regressions (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980). Condition indexes were
evaluated to detect the presence of values exceeding the chosen threshold of 30. Threshold
values generally range from 15 to 30, with 30 being a commonly used value (Hair et al., 1998). If
a condition index larger than the threshold value was identified, the variable was examined to
identify variance proportions above 90 percent. A condition index that exceeds the threshold
value and accounts for a proportion of variance of 90 percent or above for two or more
coefficients indicates multicollinearity (Hair et al., 1998).
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CHAPTER VI: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Evaluation of Data
Sample descriptive statistics and hypothesized signs are presented in Table 4. Comparing
the survey sample data to data from the 2012 Census of Agriculture is a useful strategy to
provide insight into the extent to which the survey sample is representative of Tennessee fruit
and vegetable producers (Figure 3). Farmers in the 25 to 34 and 55 to 64 age categories are
slightly overrepresented in the survey sample, and middle-aged farmers (35 to 54 years old) are
slightly underrepresented compared to the 2012 Census of Agriculture. Overall, the average age
of the sample is slightly less than the average age of principal operators of Tennessee farms
according to the 2012 Census of Agriculture, which is 59.2 (USDA-NASS, 2012).
Sample Means Comparison
Results from the comparison of characteristics between adopters and non-adopters of PL
insurance indicate that producers who adopted PL insurance coverage had more acres in fruit and
vegetable production (Table 5). A greater proportion (78%) of adopters acknowledged facing PL
risk when selling fruits and vegetables compared to the proportion of non-adopters who indicated
perceiving this risk (59%) (see question 17, Appendix B). Adopters operated larger fruit and
vegetable operations (26 acres) than non-adopters (7 acres).
Probit Regression Results
Single-equation probit regressions were estimated separately for the adoption of PL
insurance and the perception of PL risk equations. Parameter estimates and marginal effects
associated with explanatory variables included in the single-equation adoption model are shown
in Table 7. Condition indexes were under 20, thus multicollinearity was not likely to hinder
interpretation of parameter estimates. The likelihood ratio test, which tests the null hypothesis
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that all regression coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero, was significant at the 5% level.
Thus, the null hypothesis that all coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected,
suggesting significance of the overall model. The model correctly predicted 70% of responses.
Perception of PL risk (RISKP) and acres in fruit and vegetable production (ACRE)
positively affected the adoption of PL insurance coverage, consistent with the hypothesized
signs. The marginal effect for the perception of PL risk indicates that perceiving PL risk
increases the probability of adoption by 21%. A one-acre increase in fruit and vegetable
production corresponds to a 0.7% increase in the probability of adoption. Years of experience
farming (EXP), educational attainment (COLLEGE), cantaloupe production (CANTALOUPE),
lettuce production (LETTUCE), percentage of sales made through direct-to-consumer market
outlets (DIRECT), use of alternative risk management tools (FACTOR1 and FACTOR2), use of
savings to manage risk (SAV), and GAP training and/or certification (GAP) did not significantly
affect the probability that a farmer adopted PL insurance coverage.
Two-Stage Probit Regression Results
Parameter estimates and marginal effects associated with explanatory variables included
in the simultaneous equation probit regressions are presented in Table 8. Condition indexes were
examined for the the equations (13) and (14). Condition indexes remained below 20 for each set
of explanatory variables, providing no indication that multicollinearity was an issue. The null
hypothesis that all coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was tested for each model
using likelihood ratio tests. With respect to the reduced form equations, the null hypothesis that
all coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 10% and 5% level for the
adoption and perception models, respectively, suggesting weak significance of the overall
models, at best. With respect to the structural equations, the null hypothesis that all coefficients
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were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 10% level for the adoption and perception
models, suggesting weak significance of the overall models.
The Hausman specification test was used to test the null hypothesis that perceptions of PL
risk are exogenous in PL insurance adoption decisions (Table 9). The null hypothesis was not
rejected at any conventional level (χ2 = 13.63, with P = 0.254, df = 11), suggesting that the singleequation models may not be incorrectly specified.
Instrumental Variables Probit Regression Results
The instrumental variables probit regression was estimated to test for endogeneity due to
measurement error. Parameter estimates and marginal effects associated with explanatory
variables included in the IV probit model are shown in Table 10. The null hypothesis that all
regression coefficients were simultaneously equal to zero was rejected at the 1% level (χ2 =
54.34, df = 11), suggesting significance of the overall model. Of interest was the Wald χ2 test of
exogeneity, which was used to test the null hypothesis that correlation coefficient in equation
(33) was equal to zero. The null hypothesis could not be rejected at any conventional level (χ2 =
0.57, with P = 0.45, df = 1). These findings provide insufficient evidence to conclude that
perception of PL risk is endogenous due to omitted variables.
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS
This study builds on previous agricultural risk management research by analyzing the
factors influencing PL insurance adoption among Tennessee fruit and vegetable growers. The
adoption decision was modeled as using a standard probit regression model. Findings suggest that
farmers who perceived PL risk and farmers with larger fruit and vegetable operations were more
likely to adopt PL insurance.
One limitation of the study is that it made strong distributional assumptions about the error
terms used in the modeling approach. Semi-nonparametric methods have been used to address this
very issue (e.g., Velandia et al., 2014), which, if incorrectly specified, yields inconsistent
estimates. A second limitation of the study relates to the framing of the study. To clarify, the
approach considered PL insurance solely as a risk management tool. Although it briefly discussed
the benefits of PL insurance in terms of market opportunities, the role which benefits to market
access play in the adoption decision may be significant.
As this research serves merely as a building block, a worthy next step is to analyze the
distributional assumptions on which the model is based on. If the assumption about normality of
the error terms is not valid, maximum likelihood estimates would be unreliable. Thus, a seminonparametric approach, such as that taken by Velandia et al. (2014), is a natural starting point for
expanding on the foundations established in this paper.
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APPENDIX A
TABLES
Table 1. Description and Means of Alternative Risk Management Indicator Variables Used in the
Factor Analysis
Mean
Variable Description
(N = 105)
SAV
Equals one if the farmer uses or has used financial savings and
0.4286
zero otherwise
CLIAB
Equals one if the farmer uses or has used a comprehensive farm
0.3238
liability insurance policy and zero otherwise
COMB
Equals one if the farmer uses or has used a commercial business
0.1333
insurance policy and zero otherwise
HOWN
Equals one if the farmer uses or has used a homeowner’s
0.4952
insurance policy and zero otherwise
UMB
Equals one if the farmer uses or has used an umbrella insurance
0.2381
policy and zero otherwise
LLC
Equals one if the farm is structured as a corporation or Limited
0.1524
Liability Corporation and zero otherwise
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Table 2. Eigenvalues and Proportion of Variance Explained by Retained Factors
Factor
Eigenvalue
Difference
Proportion
Cumulative
FACTOR1
2.276
1.423
0.455
0.455
FACTOR2
0.853
0.821
0.171
0.626
N
105
2
ab
LR χ (10)
236.95***
a
Likelihood ratio test of independent versus saturated model.
b
Significance at the 1% level denoted by ***.
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Table 3. Rotated Factor Loadings and Uniqueness Values for Alternative Risk Management
Strategies
Factor Loading
a
Variable
Factor 1
Factor 2
Uniqueness
CLIAB
-0.068
0.760
0.458
COMB
0.923
-0.133
0.226
HOWN
-0.047
0.728
0.494
UMB
0.530
0.460
0.318
LLC
0.753
0.086
0.376
a
Variables are defined in Table 1.
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Table 4. Variable Definitions, Means, and Hypothesized Signs
Variable
PINS

RISKP

EXP
COLLEGE

ACRE
CANTALOUPE
LETTUCE
DIRECT
FACTOR1
FACTOR2
GAP

FMFARMS

N

Definition
Equals one if the farmer
carries product liability
insurance coverage and
zero otherwise
Equals one if the farmer
perceives product
liability risk and zero
otherwise
Experience farming in
years
Equals one if the farmer
earned Bachelor or
Graduate degree and zero
otherwise
Average fruit and/or
vegetable acreage grown
in 2011 and 2012
Equals one if the farmer
produced cantaloupes and
zero otherwise
Equals one if the farmer
produced lettuce and zero
otherwise
Percentage of sales made
through direct-toconsumer market outlets
Business-oriented farmer
(extracted Factor 1)
Community-oriented
farmer (extracted Factor
2)
Equals one if farmer is
Good Agricultural
Practices trained and/or
certified and zero
otherwise
Number of operations
with vegetables harvested
for fresh market in
farmer’s county
105

Hypothesized
Sign

Mean
0.35

SD
0.48

Min
0.00

Max
1.0

0.66

0.48

0.00

1.0

+

23.36

16.14

1.00

70.0

−

0.53

0.50

0.00

1.0

+

13.87

32.01

0.13

214.0

+

0.27

0.44

0.00

1.0

+

0.29

0.45

0.00

1.0

+

89.15

24.67

0.00

100.0

−

0.17

0.30

-0.00

1.04

+

0.36

0.36

-0.15

1.15

−

0.29

0.45

0.00

1.0

−

16.94

11.46

1.00

84.0
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Table 5. Comparison of Characteristics between Product Liability Insurance Adopters and NonAdopters
Variablea
Adopter Mean
Non-Adopter Mean
t statisticbc
RISKP
0.7838
0.5882
-2.04**
EXP
25.8108
22.0294
-1.15
COLLEGE
0.5405
0.5294
-0.11
ACRE
25.6149
7.4760
-2.16**†
CANTALOUPE
0.2703
0.2647
-0.06
LETTUCE
0.3243
0.2647
-0.64
DIRECT
85.8696
90.9277
1.00
FACTOR1
0.2414
0.1297
-1.87*
FACTOR2
0.3838
0.3395
-0.60
GAP
0.3243
0.2647
-0.64
N
37
68
a
Variables are defined in Table 4.
b
Significance at the 10% and 5% levels denoted by * and **, respectively.
c
T-test assuming unequal variance denoted by †.
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Table 6. Two-Stage Simultaneous Probit Regression Model Specification
Equation 13
Equation 14
Exogenous variables
Adoption (PINS)
Perception (RISKP)
EXP
✓
✓
COLLEGE
✓
✓
ACRE
✓
✓
CANTALOUPE
✓
✓
LETTUCE
✓
✓
DIRECT
✓
✓
CAUTION
✗
✓
GAP
✗
✓
FMFARMS
✓
✗
Note: The symbol ✓ indicates that a variable was included in an equation; the symbol ✗
indicates exclusion from an equation.
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Table 7. Parameter Estimates and Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Probability
of Adoption of Product Liability Insurance Using Probit Regression
Variablea
Coefficientbc
Marginal Effect
RISKP
0.6742**
0.2134
(0.3227)
EXP
0.0086
(0.0101)
COLLEGE
-0.1148
(0.2813)
ACRE
0.0196**
0.0062
(0.0097)
CANTALOUPE
-0.2864
(0.3386)
LETTUCE
0.3408
(0.3538)
DIRECT
0.0041
(0.0069)
FACTOR1
0.8037
(0.4981)
FACTOR2
0.0186
(0.4417)
SAV
-0.1987
(0.3150)
GAP
-0.0746
(0.3579)
CONSTANT
-1.6602**
(0.7874)
N
105
2
d
LR χ (11)
19.32**
e
AIC
140.95
Correctly predicted
74 (70%)
a
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.
b
Standard errors shown in parentheses.
c
Significance at the 5% level denoted by **.
d
Likelihood ratio test statistic is calculated as LR = –2[ln LR – ln LU] (Cameron and Trivedi,
2010).
e
Akaike information criterion calculated as AIC = –2ln L + 2K (Greene, 2012).
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Table 8. Parameter Estimates and Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Probability
of Adoption of Product Liability Insurance and Probability of Identifying Product Liability Risk
from Two-stage Simultaneous Probit Regression
Adoption (PINS=1)
Perception of Risk (RISKP=1)
a
bc
Variable
Coefficient
Marginal Effect
Coefficientbc
Marginal Effect
RISKPHAT
1.1047
(1.9079)
PINSHAT
0.7995**
0.3598
(0.3843)
EXP
0.0088
-0.0075
(0.0172)
(0.0112)
COLLEGE
-0.3951
0.3334
(0.3788)
(0.3337)
ACRE
0.0246
-0.0215***
-0.0080
(0.0266)
(0.0063)
CANTALOUPE
-0.7264
0.6835
(0.5567)
(0.4237)
LETTUCE
-0.2058
0.3969
(0.7159)
(0.4848)
DIRECT
0.0052
-0.0104
(0.0102)
(0.0080)
FACTOR1
-0.0057
(1.2319)
FACTOR2
0.1811
(0.6154)
SAV
-0.7394*
-0.2408
(0.4393)
GAP
-0.3443
(0.4902)
FMFARMS
-0.0033
(0.0143)
CONSTANT
-1.1101
1.7397*
(1.9079)
(0.9013)
N
105
105
2
LR χ (11/8)
15.9*
13.84*
AIC
138.27
137.01
Correctly predicted
73 (69.2%)
74 (70.4%)
a

Independent variables are defined in Table 4. PINSHAT and RISKPHAT are predicted values from equations (13)
and (14), respectively.
b
Corrected standard errors shown in parentheses.
c
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
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Table 9. Results from Hausman Specification Test
Null hypothesis
Hausman χ2 test statistic
Correct specification of single-equation probit
13.6301
regression predicting adoption (PINS)
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df
11

P-value
0.2541

Table 10. Parameter Estimates and Marginal Effects of Independent Variables on the Adoption
of Product Liability Insurance Using Instrumental Variables Probit Regression
Variablea
Coefficientbc
Marginal Effect
d
RISKP
2.1627**
0.2009
(0.8915)
EXP
0.0045
(0.0107)
COLLEGE
-0.2383
(0.2449)
ACRE
0.0150
(0.0135)
CANTALOUPE
-0.3948
(0.2909)
LETTUCE
-0.0871
(0.5436)
DIRECT
0.0032
(0.0062)
FACTOR1
0.2097
(0.8717)
FACTOR2
0.0844
(0.3853)
SAV
-0.4603
(0.2955)
GAP
-0.1959
(0.3126)
CONSTANT
-1.8268**
(0.8296)
N
105
2
Wald test of exogeneity: χ (1)
0.57
2
Wald χ (11)
54.34***
AIC
290.57
Correctly predicted
74(70.4%)
a
Explanatory variables are defined in Table 4.
b
Standard errors shown in parentheses.
c
Significance at the 5% and 1% levels denoted by ** and ***, respectively.
d
FMFARMS used as instrument.
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APPENDIX B

2013 TENNESSEE FRUIT & VEGETABLE PRODUCER SURVEY
*** Product Liability Risk ***
Fruit and vegetable growers face important risks associated with foodborne illness outbreaks. Two
examples are:
1) Liability risks in that consumers can take legal actions against producers demanding monetary
compensation claiming the food they purchased made them sick.
2) Regulators can issue a product recall or warning because of a foodborne illness outbreak that
can cause an enormous drop in product sales and an economic loss for all producers including
those whose product was not contaminated.
Product liability insurance may help protect producers by limiting their possible exposure to risks
associated with consumers’ claims of injury caused by harmful or contaminated products. Other
insurance products may help producers cover direct and indirect costs associated with product
recalls. Researchers at the University of Tennessee request your help in completing the attached
survey to design educational tools that help growers understand product liability risks and how to
protect against these risks.
The enclosed 7-page survey should take about 20 to 25 minutes to complete. This survey is being
sent to a random sample of 700 Tennessee fruit and vegetable producers. The survey is funded by
the USDA Specialty Crop Block Grant and is conducted as part of a research and outreach project
in cooperation with the Tennessee Department of Agriculture. Your participation is strictly
voluntary, and your response to this survey will be confidential. Responses to the survey will be
aggregated and published in summary form only.
Please complete the survey and mail it back to us in the enclosed self-addressed postage-paid
envelope. Your response is extremely valuable, and we look forward to receiving your completed
survey. The survey results will be made available at http://vegetables.tennessee.edu. Thank you
for taking the time to assist the University of Tennessee’s Institute of Agriculture with this survey.
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*** IMPORTANT ***
Are you the best person to answer questions about fruit and vegetable marketing and product
liability on your farm? If so, please answer the following questions. If not, please direct this
questionnaire to the person who makes the fruit and vegetable marketing decisions. Please note
that questions about your farming operation apply to the 2011 and 2012 crop years.
A. PLEASE TELL US ABOUT YOURSELF AND YOUR OPERATION
1.

In what county is your primary farming operation located?
_________________ County

2.

In what year were you born? ____________

3. How many years have you farmed? ________years
4. How many years have you been selling fruits or vegetables? ________years
5. Please indicate your sex (check one)
Male
Female
6. Which of the following describes the highest level of education you have obtained?
Less than High School/GED
High School/GED
Some college
Associate degree or Vocational school or equivalent
Bachelors’ degree
Graduate degree
7. How many persons are in your household, including yourself?
1
2
3
4
5 or more
8. What is your primary occupation?
Full time farmer
Employed full-time off the farm
Employed part-time off the farm
Retired and farming part-time
Usually employed (full time or part time) off the farm, but currently unemployed
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9. On the land you owned or rented from others, how many acres did you use to produce fruits,
vegetables, and other crops in the last two years?
Fruits, Vegetables, and
Other Crops

2011
Acres in Production
Owned
Rented

2012
Acres in Production
Owned
Rented

Fruits and Vegetables
Other Crops

10. Which of the following farm products and services were produced on your farm in 2012?
(Check all that apply).
PLEASE NOTE THAT “FRESH MARKET SALES” INCLUDES U-PICK FOR THIS SURVEY.
Fruits and/or vegetables for fresh market sales
Fruits and/or vegetables for processing
Grains
Hay
Nursery crops, Greenhouse crops, or Christmas
trees
Nuts
Other (please list):________________________

Poultry or Eggs
Milk
Beef
Pork
Lamb or goat meat
Value-added farm products (e.g. ham, wine, cheese)
Agri-tourism

B. MARKETING INFORMATION
IF YOU DID NOT SELL FRUITS AND VEGETABLES YOU RAISED IN THE LAST TWO YEARS,
PLEASE ANSWER “NO” TO QUESTION 11 AND THEN SKIP TO QUESTION 27.
11. Did you sell fruits and/or vegetables that you raised in 2011 or 2012?
___Yes, proceed to Question 12
___No, skip to Question 27
12. Did you sell fruits and/or vegetables purchased from someone else in the last two years?
2011: ____Yes
____ No

2012: ____ Yes
____ No

13. Approximately what percentage of your farm’s gross annual sales came from fresh market sales of
fruits and vegetables in the last two years? 2011_______%

2012_______%

14. Approximately what percentage of your farm’s gross annual sales came from sales of fruits and
vegetables for processing in the last two years? 2011 ________%
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2012______%

15. Which of the following fruits and vegetables did you produce for sale (for fresh market sales or for
processing) in the last two years? (Check all that apply).
Apples
Bell peppers
Blueberries

Grapes
Lettuce
Greens

Snap Beans
Squash
Strawberries

Blackberries

Okra

Sweet Corn

Broccoli
Cabbage
Cantaloupes
Cherries
Cucumbers and/or Pickles

Onions
Peaches
Pears
Plums and prunes
Pumpkins

Tomatoes
Turnips
Watermelons
Other fruits__________________
Other vegetables _____________

16. Mark with an “X” the marketing methods you used in the last two years in selling fruits and/or
vegetables and estimate the percentage of your sales made through each method. Mark with an “X”
those methods you used that require product-liability insurance.
Marketing
methods used
(mark with an
“X”)
Direct Sales to Consumers:
On farm sales
Farmers’ markets
Community Supported Agriculture
(CSA)
Roadside stands
Pick-your-own
Other direct sales(describe)

2011

2012

Estimate the
percentage of sales
made through this
method (each
column should total
100%)
2011
2012

___________________________________

Sales to Intermediaries:
Grower cooperatives
Wholesale buyers/brokers/packers
Other farmers
Other intermediaries (describe)
_______________________________________

Sales to Retail Outlets:
Grocery stores
Food cooperatives
Restaurants
Institutions (such as schools and
hospitals)
Other retail outlets (describe)
_____________________________________

100%
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100%

These marketing
methods require
product liability
insurance (mark
with an “X”)

C. RISK MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY INSURANCE
17. What are the risks you face when selling fruits and/or vegetables? (Mark all the risks that apply with
an “X”).
Mark with
an “X”

Risks

Customer liability associated with injuries caused by harmful products such as
contaminated fresh products
Customer liability associated with bodily injury that occurred on the farm premises
Product recall or warning because of foodborne illness outbreak
Low sales volume, unsold produce
Quality problems with produce due to weather, pests, etc.
Buyer back out, failure to fulfill commitments
Market fluctuations (e.g., low price, low profits)
Other risk (describe) __________________________

18. Mark an “X” to the left of each risk management option that you use or have used to manage risk in
your operation. On a scale from 1 to 7 where “1” is not important and “7” is very important, circle
how important you believe each option you marked is in terms of risk management on a typical farm.
Mark
an “X”
if used

Risk Management Options
Financial savings/reserves
Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) or Adjusted Gross
Revenue-Lite (AGR-lite) crop insurance
Actual Production History or APH insurance (Yield Base
Insurance)
Product liability insurance policy
Product recall policy
Comprehensive farm liability policy

Not
Important

Very
Important

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Commercial business policy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Homeowner’s policy
Umbrella policy
Become a corporation or limited liability company (LLC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) training/certification

Other (describe) _________________________
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19. On a scale from 1 to 7, where “1” is not familiar and “7” is very familiar, please

circle

your familiarity with each insurance coverage option for fresh produce growers.
Not
Familiar

Risk Management Options

Very
Familiar

Product liability insurance policy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Comprehensive farm liability policy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Homeowner’s policy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Umbrella policy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Commercial business policy
Product recall policy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) or Adjusted Gross Revenue-Lite
(AGR-lite) crop insurance
Actual Production History or APH insurance (Yield Base
Insurance)
Other (describe) _____________________________

The following definition may be helpful:
Product liability insurance protects producers against consumer claims of injury
caused by harmful products such as contaminated fresh or value added products.
20. Do you have insurance that provides product liability coverage?
____ Yes
____ No → In the space below, please indicate the main reasons why you don’t have
product liability coverage and then Skip to Question 27:

___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
____ I Don’t Know → Skip to Question 27.
21. What type of insurance policy do you use to provide product liability coverage?
Product liability insurance policy
Comprehensive farm liability policy
Homeowner’s policy
Umbrella policy
Commercial business policy
Other (please describe) ___________________________________
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22. Check the category that best reflects your product liability insurance coverage.
Under $100,000
$100,000 - $299,999
$300,000 - $599,999
$600,000 - $999,999
$1 million - $1.9 million
$2 million - $2.9 million
$3 million - $3.9 million
$4 million - $4.9 million
$5 million – up
23. Check the category that best reflects the annual cost of your insurance coverage.
Under $1,000
$1,000 - $1,999
$2,000 - $2,999
$3,000 - $3,999
$4,000 – $4,999
$5,000 - up
24. What are the names of the insurance companies that have provided product liability coverage for
you?

___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________
25. On a scale of 1 to 7 where “1” is little or no understanding and “7” is great understanding, how well
do you understand your insurance policy that provides product liability coverage?
Please circle a number:

Little Understanding
Great Understanding
1……2……3…….4……5……6……7

26. When learning about product liability insurance where did you find information?
Information Source
Insurance Agent
Social Networks (e.g. Facebook, twitter)
Other farmers
Popular press
Farm Manager or Consultant
Extension/University sources (e.g., publications, Extension agent)
Other(s):_____________________________________________

___________________________________________________
___________________________________________________
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Mark box with
an “X” if
currently use
or have used

D. INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR HOUSEHOLD
27. Check what percentage of your taxable household income was from farming in the last two years?
2011
None
Less than 25%
25% to 49%
50% to 74%
More than 75%

2012
None
Less than 25%
25% to 49%
50% to 74%
More than 75%

28. Check the category that best reflects your taxable household income from both farm and
non-farm sources in 2012:
Under $10,000
$10,000 - $14,999
$15,000 - $24,999
$25,000 - $34,999
$35,000 - $49,999

$50,000 - $74,999
$75,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $150,000
more than $150,000

Thank you for your time!
Please place the survey in the enclosed self-addressed postage-paid envelope and
return by mail. A summary of the results will be made available at
http://vegetables.tennessee.edu/.
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information systems and economic valuation techniques through an internship with one of the
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Prior to earning a B.S. in natural resource and environmental economics from the University of
Tennessee in May 2014, he embarked on a month-long journey to Ecuador, South America,
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hike to the 15,413 ft. summit of Ruku Pichincha Volcano, studied the cultural impacts of early
oil exploration in the region, and realized his passion for economic development. Matt’s research
background is in the application of microeconomic theory to farm business behavior in insurance
markets. He has an interest in rural development, land use change, energy and global security,
and foreign policy.
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